Sovereignty in Flux: Rethinking the Arctic Through a Post-Westphalian Lens

Abstract 

This article rethinks Arctic sovereignty as a shared, layered, and legally plural concept. It argues that the region has never followed the Westphalian system. Instead, its governance reflects deep ecological ties, indigenous cross-border unity, and legal systems like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council. Case studies of the Inuit and Sámi show how Indigenous groups exercise power. They shape policy, claim rights, and take part in global talks. Environmental treaties and science-based agreements also limit state actions. Recent tensions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) expansion and Russia’s isolation after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have put stress on this shared order. Yet, cooperation has not collapsed. Legal tools still work. The Arctic shows that sovereignty can be negotiated, not just imposed. It offers key lessons for building peaceful, shared rule in global politics.

Introduction

The Arctic is often seen by many scholars as a test case for the evolution of sovereignty in the 21st century. The Arctic region has never conformed neatly with the Classical Westphalian¹ sovereignty (Nicol & Zellen, 2022, 48). The combination of harsh, cold environmental conditions, sparse populations, and the presence of Indigenous peoples with homelands spanning multiple modern states means that state power in the Arctic has always been qualified and negotiated. The central thesis of this article is that the Arctic is not merely becoming post-Westphalian² in the modern era, but it has historically been at odds with the Westphalian paradigm. The contemporary institutions have been catching up with that reality.

To develop this argument, the article proceeds in several parts.

First, we explore the ecological and historical interconnectedness of the Arctic that predates Westphalian borders of nation-states³. This includes the migratory patterns of animals and the mobility of Indigenous peoples like the Sámi and Inuit. This created a circumpolar sphere of interaction that was unbounded by later nation-state borders.

Second, the article examines the limits of Westphalian sovereignty in the Arctic context. This would be highlighted by how the traditional model of absolute territorial jurisdiction has been undermined by unique Arctic environments and Indigenous peoples’ rights.

Third, we analyse institutional and legal responses that have emerged in the Arctic. We look at how the Arctic Council and UNCLOS are adaptations to the post-Westphalian realities.These regimes, conceivably with their limitations, illustrate how governance in the Far North has shifted toward cooperation, shared authority, and rule-based dispute resolution in lieu of competitive sovereignty.

Finally, the article discusses the emerging post-Westphalian configuration of the Arctic and its implications. We delve into the challenges to this configuration because of the ongoing global crises. Rather than viewing the evolving Arctic order as an anomaly, the conclusion considers what lessons this region might hold for International Relations (IR) theory and global governance. Through this, an attempt is made to rethink sovereignty and borders in today's world and look at how and why Arctic sovereignty is being reconceptualised.

A Borderless Biosphere: Ecology, History, and Interdependence in the Arctic

Long before the Arctic states drew their territorial borders, the region functioned as an interconnected environmental and cultural space. The Arctic environment is transboundary in nature; as atmospheric and ocean currents, migratory wildlife, and climate systems ignore human-imposed political borders. This unique geography creates natural zones of interdependence that undercut the notion of sealed territorial units.

The Arctic is also a dramatic theatre of climate change. The Arctic is warming at an alarming rate, roughly three to four times faster than the global average (Tandon, 2022). This phenomenon, known as Arctic amplification, has led to rapid melting of sea ice, thawing permafrost, and other cascading effects that no single state can deal with alone. The impacts of these changes are far beyond the region. The Arctic countries (the world at large) share a collective interest in addressing climate change (Breum, 2024). This has led to initiatives like the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004), and the Arctic Council’s working groups have included climate change as a central focus. The environment essentially “legitimated [the Arctic] as a unit of governance” beyond national units (Nicol & Zellen, 2022).

A larger strategic layer emerges with the Arctic’s rich deposits of critical minerals and metals like nickel, rare earth elements, lithium, and others. These resources are increasingly central to the global green transition. The Arctic Economic Council’s 2024 report notes that 31 out of 34 critical raw materials essential for renewable energy and electric vehicles are found in the region (Thorsson, 2024). Greenland, in particular, holds some of the world’s largest rare earth and uranium reserves. This has drawn intense geopolitical interest and sparked debates over mining rights and sovereignty (Jamal, 2022). These resources add another layer of competition among Arctic Council members, where environmental concerns intersect with strategic and economic ambitions.

As the Arctic ice melts because of climate change, the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean open to new international waterways and resources. To preempt unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (2018) was signed by Arctic and some non-Arctic states (The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement – What It Is, Is Not and Might Be, 2023). Even within national jurisdictions, ecological realities encourage cooperation among states. Norway and Russia, through the Joint Fisheries Commission, manage fisheries in the Barents Sea to sustain fish stocks like cod that migrate across their EEZ boundaries (The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement – What It Is, Is Not and Might Be, 2023). Similarly, Canada and the USA signed an agreement to coordinate conservation of the Porcupine caribou herd that annually migrates between the two countries, oblivious to the international border it crosses (Canada-United States Agreement on Porcupine Caribou Herd Conservation, 2022).

Pollution and environmental disasters further highlight shared vulnerability in the region. A nuclear accident or a pollutant spill in one part of the Arctic will inevitably affect others due to ocean currents or winds. Recognising this, region-wide agreements like the 1996 Arctic Environmental Protection (precursor to the Arctic Council), 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement, and the 2013 Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement came into force. These agreements divided the Arctic into functional zones where states have taken responsibility for emergencies. For example, in the SAR Agreement, each state accepted an area of the Arctic for which it is the search and rescue coordinator. Underlining the agreement is the acceptance that saving lives in the Arctic is a joint duty that transcends sovereign borders, as no country can manage the SAR infrastructure alone (Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, 2011).

Environmental changes in the Arctic, like permafrost thaw and river flows, cause cross-border impacts. For instance, the downstream effects of the Siberian river flow changes on the salinity of the Arctic Ocean or the release of massive greenhouse gases from Russian permafrost affect global climate. Permafrost thaw releases the trapped carbon dioxide and methane, potent greenhouse gases that intensify global warming through a self-reinforcing feedback loop. Russia’s restriction on the sharing of scientific data since 2022 (Russia-Ukraine war), such as permafrost methane emissions, has raised alarms because such actions hamper the global ability to model climate feedbacks (Breum, 2024). Westphalian borders can intensify geopolitical rifts by framing environmental issues through the lens of state sovereignty. This, in turn, fragments scientific cooperation, undermining the collective ability to address climate change, which further increases vulnerability to its impacts. This fragmentation of scientific cooperation due to geopolitical rifts shows that nature does not respect Westphalian boundaries. Attempts to compartmentalise science by sovereignty backfire, leaving all sides vulnerable. Therefore, the Arctic environment necessitates a paradigm of shared sovereignty and joint management, laying a foundation for post-Westphalian governance.

Indigenous Sovereignties Across Borders: Reimagining Political Authority in the Arctic

Indigenous peoples of the Arctic have lived in the circumpolar regions for millennia (Csonka, 2022, 21). They long predate the modern state. Arctic indigenous nations like Inuit, Sámi, Athabaskans, Aleut, and others have transnational homelands spanning multiple countries (About the Indigenous Sami - Sanningskommissionen Samer). Through their institutional innovations, cultural continuity, and self-determination efforts, they exemplify overlapping sovereignty, where the authority is shared between states and indigenous polities and even among states through indigenous networks. 

Let’s consider the basic demographics of the Arctic. The Arctic is home to roughly 4 million people, of whom about 10% (400,000) are indigenous. They represent over 40 different ethnic groups. Most of these people live across borders. The Sámi live in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The Inuit live across northern Canada (Inuit Nunangat), Greenland, Alaska, and Chukotka. Borders drawn later by colonial powers ignored their seasonal migrations, family ties, and trade routes. But these ties stayed strong. As a result, many Indigenous communities now form transnational regions. These include Sámpi (or Sápmi) for the Sámi, and Inuit Nunangat for the Inuit.

Throughout the 20th century, Indigenous peoples became more organised. After the 1970s, they formed organised bodies that worked across states. One key body is the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), formed in 1977 (Narwhal, 2025). It unites Inuit from Canada, Greenland, Alaska, and Russia into a single advocacy body. The Sámi formed the Saami Council in 1956, connecting Sámi across the Nordic states and Russia. These bodies articulate indigenous perspectives and rights at international forums. They act like the diplomatic representatives for their people on the global stage. They create parallel diplomacy alongside state diplomacy. In a 2025 interview, Sara Olsvig, ICC Chair from Greenland, said that since 1977, the Inuit Circumpolar Council has given Inuit in four countries a united voice in the world (Patar, 2025). The ICC speaks for about 180,000 Inuit. During the Cold War, the ICC worked behind the scenes to reconnect Soviet Inuit from Chukotka with their kin. This wasn’t a state-led move; it was Indigenous diplomacy.

These efforts show that Indigenous sovereignty is not just cultural. It is also legal and political. The 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) supports this. Articles 3 and 26 state that Indigenous peoples have rights to self-determination, traditional lands, and resources (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) – Lanark County Neighbours for Truth and Reconciliation). Although UNDRIP is declaratory (non-binding), it has normative force.  The ICC’s 2009 Sovereignty Declaration leveraged this, stating that Indigenous Arctic peoples wield their own distinct Indigenous sovereignty over their homelands, located either within or across Westphalian state boundaries,” thus “challenging the unitary nature of state sovereignty (A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, 2009). They claimed that Indigenous sovereignty can exist in the same space as state sovereignty. This is a direct challenge to the Westphalian idea that only one sovereign can rule a space. UNDRIP does not allow secession (Article 46 preserves states’ territorial integrity), but it allows power-sharing and new forms of rule (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007, 28-29).

Case Study: The Sámi People. 

The Sámi are Europe’s only recognised Indigenous people. Their advocacy challenges the state-centric lens of Arctic geopolitics, offering a vision rooted in cultural survival and sustainability. In response to centuries of colonial assimilation policies by Nordic states, the Sámi have successfully established their institutions. They elected Sámi Parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland (and a consultative body in Russia), which work together through a Sámi Parliamentary Council. The Sami through these bodies exercise a degree of self-rule on matters of language, culture, and education, effectively sharing governance with the state within Sámi traditional territories. The Sámi also engage internationally. They have Permanent Participant status in the Arctic Council via the Saami Council. This allows them input on Arctic-wide decisions.

“My home is in my heart / it migrates with me..

You know it brother / you understand sister

but what do I say to strangers?

they come with papers / and say:

this belongs to nobody

this is government land

everything belongs to the State.”⁴

-       An excerpt from My Home Is in My Heart by Nils-Aslak Valkeapää (Sámi poet, artist, and musician)

The Sámi practice what might be termed internal self-determination (autonomy within states) combined with cross-border unity. They have formal cooperation mechanisms with state governments, too, exemplifying “state-tribe sovereign partnerships”. For instance, Sámi representatives negotiate tri-national agreements on reindeer herding, enabling Sámi herders to cross national borders with their herds as required by seasonal cycles (McGwin, 2019). This illustrates functional overlapping sovereignty: while states maintain formal borders, they concede rights to Sámi that effectively dilute those borders in practice (EU-Unit — Sámiráđđi). The result is a layered jurisdiction in Sápmi, where Sámi norms and state laws must coexist. The Sámi Arctic Strategy further emphasises co-production of knowledge and policy with state authorities, rather than top-down governance.

Case Study: The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). 

The ICC’s role in Arctic governance is another example. The ICC has become an influential player in international fora: it holds Permanent Participant status in the Arctic Council. ICC has a voice at the UN. For instance, during climate conferences, ICC leaders emphasise Arctic Indigenous perspectives. It also engages the International Maritime Organization (IMO)⁵ and other bodies on issues like the Polar Code⁶ for shipping. In the ICC worldview, sovereignty has a people-centric meaning (Labh, 2025). Olsvig articulates that for Inuit, “sovereignty means self-determination” and is non-negotiable. Inuit assert that they “were here before state borders were drawn… have lived here regardless of acts of securitisation or state-centred sovereignty” (Patar, 2025). This historical fact undercuts Westphalian claims by implying that state sovereignty in the Arctic is a relative newcomer. Indeed, Inuit in Canada and Greenland have achieved self-government arrangements (Nunavut, Greenland Home Rule) that grant them substantial authority over internal matters. Greenland, with its own parliament and government, is on a path toward eventual independence from Denmark, a unique case where an Indigenous-majority territory could become a fully sovereign state, effectively transforming Westphalian sovereignty by adding a new state born from decolonisation.

Inuit diplomacy has changed how states act. One strong example is Greenland’s role in defence talks. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Denmark agreed to set up the Thule Air Base in Greenland. But today, Greenland demands a seat at the table. It says the deal must now be trilateral instead of a bilateral affair. This shift matters. Greenland’s Inuit leaders claim a place in defence policy, once off-limits. This is shared sovereignty in real time. The issue is not just about bases. It’s about who gets to decide. Olsvig, a Greenland Inuit leader, said it clearly: “There is no such thing as saying, ‘You have self-determination, but only to this line. (Patar, 2025)’” Inuit want control over hard security, too. They reject the idea that only state sovereignty trumps their rights in any domain. Denmark had to adjust. It now includes Greenland in the Arctic military and foreign policy (Stasiuk, 2025).

This isn’t just one case. It fits a larger shift. The synergy of Indigenous transnational efforts with international norms has led to the pluralisation of authority in the Arctic. Canada’s 2022 policy reflects this (Csonka, 2022). It officially recognised Inuit Nunangat as a unique region which includes four areas in the north where Inuit live. With land claim deals, Inuit now help manage huge areas. That includes control over parts of Nunavut’s land and water. This is a move away from one-state rule. It can be described as a “state-tribe sovereign partnership”. This reimagining aligns with the post-Westphalian concept that sovereignty can be divisible and shared. The next section shows how these ideas are now built into real Arctic institutions.

Shared Sovereignty and Legal Pluralism: Institutions of Arctic Governance

The Arctic shows that state authority is no longer absolute or exclusive. Instead, governance is characterised by legal pluralism, participation of multiple actors, and institutionalised cooperation. Law, science, diplomacy, and Indigenous voices now work side by side. Three key frameworks show this: the Arctic Council, UNCLOS, and the Svalbard Treaty. These institutions together demonstrate how Arctic governance structures operationalise shared sovereignty.

The Arctic Council began in 1996 with the Ottawa Declaration. It brings together eight Arctic states and six Indigenous Permanent Participants. These include the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the Saami Council. Indigenous peoples don’t just observe as they help shape what the Council does. Though they lack voting rights, they steer research, advise governments, and shape agendas. This breaks the old rule that Indigenous matters stay inside states. Instead, Arctic governance is built on consent and trust, and institutionalised a norm of inclusive governance. The Council’s strength is epistemic authority because it produces scientific assessments (although non-binding) that shape state policy. This creates what some call “Arctic exceptionalism”⁷—a way of working that values peace and facts over force. The Council stayed active even after Russia took Crimea in 2014. That made it stand out in global diplomacy. It has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize more than once. It also includes 13 Observer states. To join, these countries must accept Arctic state sovereignty and UNCLOS rules. This signals broader stakeholder engagement under international law.

Complementing this institutional framework, the legal scaffolding is provided by UNCLOS—the law of the sea. Even though the U.S.remains a non-ratifier, it follows it as customary law. Coastal states get a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)⁸ under UNCLOS. They can ask for more if they prove the extension of their continental shelf scientifically. These claims go to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This process is based on scientific proof, not power. In 2008, five Arctic Ocean states signed the Ilulissat Declaration. They collectively affirmed that existing legal regimes suffice for regional governance. They negated a new treaty like the one for Antarctica. Contrary to alarmist narratives of a “race for the Arctic⁹,” countries have used the law. Russia, Canada, and Denmark all filed overlapping claims, but they used the CLCS and diplomatic negotiations. Legal settlements like the Barents Sea Treaty (2010) and the Canada-Greenland deal (2022) exemplify this peaceful process.

Even the assertion of sovereignty is constrained by international legal endorsement. Article 234 of UNCLOS lets states set special shipping regulations in ice-covered waters. Russia and Canada both use this to control routes like the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage (Gavrilov et al., 2019). The U.S. objects but only in courtrooms, not through force. Other regimes also shape Arctic life. The Polar Code, set by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2017, sets safety and environmental rules for ships. Arctic states helped build this code as they gave up some power to gain shared safety.

The Svalbard Treaty (1920) adds a final layer. It gave Norway sovereignty over the Svalbard islands, but with limits. All signatories get equal access to land and resources and non-discriminatory treatment for all signatories. No military bases are allowed. This “modified sovereignty” still works after 100 years. Even when Russia and Norway dispute over fishing zones, they do so through legal talks and have remained within diplomatic bounds.

These systems create what can be described as a multi-layered regime complex. Power is spread horizontally across countries, Indigenous groups, and global bodies. Sovereignty in the Arctic is not fixed. It is conditional, negotiated, and shaped by law. While Arctic states remain central, more countries now take part. Observer states work through legal tools and soft influence. That makes Arctic governance more global, but it also raises risks. This system works best during a geopolitical detente. Whether it can survive new rivalries remains to be seen.

From Cooperation to Contestation: Geopolitical Stress and the Fragility of Arctic Governance

The Arctic’s post-Westphalian governance regime model faced significant disruptions after the start of Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. The Arctic Council was fractured. The so-called “Arctic 7” paused cooperation with Russia, which held the chair. One-third of Council activities were halted. The idea of Arctic exceptionalism that the Arctic could stay peaceful despite global conflict, was shaken (Paul, 2022). This had two key effects. First, traditional Westphalian military logic came back. NATO grew stronger in the Arctic, adding Finland and Sweden. Russia saw this as a threat, which saw the accession as encirclement. Moscow responded by militarising its Arctic frontier, expanding its missile defences, and integrating Arctic scenarios into its strategic calculus. In reply, the U.S. and Canada re-emphasised sovereignty in territorial claims, especially around Greenland and the Northwest Passage. This shift hurt Indigenous groups. Their ideas of shared custodianship for the land were pushed aside. Some Indigenous leaders warned that they were being left out of talks on sovereignty. As defence talk grows louder, shared governance grows weaker. For example, Russia restricted access to Arctic climate data after 2022.

Second, Arctic governance started to fragment. With the Council frozen, Western states have sought ad hoc alternatives. In 2023, Norway restarted working groups without in-person Russian participation. Russia turned east instead. It built Arctic ties with China and other BRICS states by teaming up on shipping routes and LNG projects. This may lead to two Arctic blocs. One will be Western, tied to law and Indigenous rights, and the other may be China-Russia-led, focused more on resources and potentially less on rules. Analysts warn that China might leverage Russia’s isolation to promote its own Arctic goals. This could weaken the rules built around UNCLOS and the Arctic Council.

Still, some post-Westphalian systems remain. Scientific collaboration continues as teams of scientists keep working through neutral groups like the International Arctic Science Committee. The Polar Code, led by the IMO, still covers shipping rules for all Arctic states, including Russia and China. Legal continental shelf claims under UNCLOS are still moving forward. Both Russia and Canada continue with their seabed claims. These legal steps show that rules still matter. Indigenous diplomacy is also active. Groups like the Inuit Circumpolar Council and Gwich’in Council International push to keep cooperation alive. They argue that Arctic talks must include Indigenous voices, even in tense times.

NATO’s role is growing, but it could help keep the peace. Some leaders say NATO can both defend and avoid escalation. If it does so, space remains for shared work on science and the environment. This could lead to a split system: defence handled by alliances, while softer issues like climate and research stay shared. In short, the Arctic’s shared rule is under stress, but not broken. We may see a new mixed model. States will compete over security, but still work together in other areas. Nature, law, and Indigenous networks push back against a full return to old-style state control. The Arctic’s future depends on how well this balance can hold.

Conclusion

The Arctic shows how classical Westphalian ideas of sovereignty are being redefined. The region is no longer governed solely by states. Power is shared. It is layered, conditional, and built through agreement. States still lead, but they are not alone. They work alongside international legal regimes, multilateral institutions, and Indigenous nations. Climate change and transboundary ecosystems force states toward cooperative sovereignty. They sign deals on search and rescue, fisheries, and sea zones. These treaties demonstrate that states will pragmatically relinquish unilateral decision-making for the collective benefit. At the same time, Indigenous groups like the Sámi and Inuit claim power based on deep roots and shared land. Their presence in bodies like the Arctic Council has reshaped how decisions are made.

Institutions such as the Arctic Council and UNCLOS exemplify the post-Westphalian model. They foster consensus as they lower tensions. Even after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, many states upheld Arctic legal norms. Science and sea law still bring countries to the table even when security logics have re-emerged.

The Arctic offers a microcosm of future global governance. It shows that sovereignty doesn’t have to be a zero-sum game. It can be negotiated between actors. It can support both state interests and Indigenous self-rule. This kind of rule builds peace, protects the planet, and respects people’s rights. The lesson is clear. In an era of planetary interdependence, the Arctic teaches that sovereignty is no longer simply about control. Sovereignty is also about stewardship, restraint, and shared responsibility.

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Endnotes

1.  The classical Westphalian system refers to the principles established by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, a series of treaties that ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. These treaties laid the foundation for modern international relations by affirming the sovereignty of states, the inviolability of territorial borders, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states—core tenets that continue to underpin the legal and political structure of the international system.

2.  Post-Westphalian refers to a shift away from the classical Westphalian model of absolute, territorially bounded state sovereignty toward more fluid and overlapping forms of authority. In post-Westphalian configurations, governance is often shared among states, international institutions, and non-state actors, with emphasis on cooperation, legal regimes, and transnational norms rather than exclusive territorial control.

3.  The term “nation-state” is used here in line with classical Westphalian theory, which assumes a convergence between the cultural nation and the sovereign state. However, in this article, we use “state” throughout for analytical precision, as most modern states are multinational and sovereignty is vested in the state as a legal entity, not necessarily a unified nation.

4.  This poem speaks to the Sámi's migratory lifeways, where home is not fixed but carried across the land. It powerfully contrasts Indigenous stewardship with the colonial imposition of state ownership, revealing the deep disconnect between these worldviews.

5.  IMO (International Maritime Organization) is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for regulating shipping. It develops global standards for the safety, security, and environmental performance of international maritime transport.

6.  Polar Code refers to the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, adopted by the IMO to enhance safety and environmental protection in Arctic and Antarctic regions. It sets mandatory standards for ship design, equipment, operations, training, and environmental protection in polar conditions.

7.  Arctic exceptionalism refers to the idea that the Arctic is a zone of peace and cooperation, distinct from global geopolitical tensions. It highlights the region’s history of scientific collaboration, Indigenous diplomacy, and multilateral governance. However, this notion is increasingly challenged by rising strategic competition and militarization.

8.  The 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) grants coastal states special rights over marine resources and economic activities within 200 nautical miles from their baselines. Beyond this, the continental shelf may be claimed if it is a natural extension of the landmass, allowing further resource rights. Areas beyond national jurisdiction are considered the high seas, where all states enjoy freedoms of navigation and access, regulated under international law.

9.  The race for the Arctic is often understood as a modern geopolitical scramble for territory, resources, and influence, drawing parallels to the 19th-century Scramble for Africa. Like earlier colonial pursuits, it involves powerful states and corporations competing for control over untapped natural wealth, strategic routes, and political dominance. This perspective highlights patterns of resource extraction, marginalization of Indigenous peoples, and legal ambiguity exploited for national gain. The Arctic, thus, becomes a frontier of contested sovereignty and neo-imperial ambition.