Is Right Wing Populism seeing a resurgence in the world right now?

Abstract

Over the last few decades, social sciences in the Western world have been bewitched by a new subject of study: the rise of right-wing ideology. The novelty of this phenomenon must be placed in context since the left-right spatial distinction has been part of political reflection from its emergence in the French Revolution. We could refer to it as an old acquaintance that, in the past, used to call the attention of a small group of eccentrics and now is one of the most popular subjects in mainstream academia around the globe, inspiring extensive literature and countless seminars, forums and research centres. The extensive rediscovery of right-wing politics as a subject of inquiry renews some questions that have occupied scholars for a long time: What are the historical roots of these traditions and their fluctuations over time? What are the geography-specific forms taken by different right-wing traditions? In addition, new questions arise in the light of the socio-political transformations of the twenty-first century. These developments call for careful research, intellectual responsibility, and empathy rather than dogmatic assumptions. Instead of asking whether "the right is always antidemocratic" or assuming that "popular segments are left-wing by nature," it is more meaningful to ask how the resurgence of right-wing populism is reshaping democratic institutions, political discourse, and society at large. Such questions resist simplistic answers and require a nuanced engagement with the historical, social, and political forces driving these transformations. 

Introduction

In recent years, the academic literature on radical right-wing populism in advanced liberal democracies has grown at an exponential rate. Major political science journals have dedicated special issues to the phenomenon, leading scholars throughout the social sciences from sociology to economics, from communications to gender studies have taken note of its importance and made significant contributions to the burgeoning literature, and the media has done their part to disseminate their findings among the general public. As a result, radical right-wing populism is currently one of the most closely examined and most profoundly explored and scrutinised phenomena in contemporary comparative politics.

Several reasons account for this development: most importantly and most often mentioned in recent studies is the election of Donald Trump and the outcome of the Brexit referendum; secondly, the upsurge of support for radical right-wing populist parties in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, particularly in France, Italy, Austria and the Scandinavian countries; thirdly, the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties in Western European countries previously thought to be immune to radical right-wing mobilisation, i.e., Germany, United Kingdom and Spain. Last but not least, the diffusion of a political climate of democratic distemper, which has become a breeding ground for a “politics of backlash”, “illiberal democracy” and a yearning for a strongman phenomenon.

This, however, is only half of the story. Contextual conditions favourable for populist mobilisation remain latent as long as there are no credible and persuasive political entrepreneurs capable of translating vague popular unease and apprehension into a terse, efficacious narrative. This explains, for instance, why Germany and Spain for a long time appeared relatively immune to the sirens of radical right-wing populism, a fact that was erroneously attributed to the lasting impact of the lessons learnt from history. The dramatic gains of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), particularly in the eastern part of Germany in recent regional and national elections, as well as the sudden upsurge of electoral support for Vox in national and regional elections in Spain, have gained from this phenomenon. They have demonstrated once again that the political appeal to resentment is a wide, open field ready to welcome any political newcomer savvy enough to take advantage of the opportunities offered by popular political disenchantment, disaffection and rage. The dramatic resurgence of the radical populist right in Flanders and the sudden upsurge of support for a relative newcomer in the Netherlands in the most recent European election are prominent cases in point.

What essentially do we mean when we speak of right-wing populism?

Stripped down to its most basic core, radical right-wing populism is a fusion of two ideational elements: populism and nativism. Populism is a political doctrine that holds that society is divided into two antagonistic blocs: the vast majority of ordinary people and a relatively small elite that acts in its own interest. Populism is essentially about mobilising ordinary citizens, the “low” around a common set of grievances and resentments that provide them with a shared notion of identity and pit them against “those above” deemed responsible for all their grievances. Populism claims for itself to restore voice to the people and thus ensure that politics once again becomes the authentic reflection and expression of their popular will.

Nativism is informed by the notion that the material and cultural interests of the “native-born” should be accorded absolute priority over those new to the community and that solely on the grounds that the former are natives. Nativism is closely linked to infra-humanisation, that is, the “subtle denial of the humanity of out groups which is then expressed in the differential treatment of outgroup members”. Politically, it involves a variety of measures on the part of the “indigenous” population designed to defend, maintain and revive the cherished heritage of their culture. In the European context, where the concept originated, it has centred upon the “demand that citizens come before non- citizens, Europeans before foreigners, and that we take care of home first before abroad”. The same instinct has found expression on the other side of the Atlantic: the Trump administration's second term saw the dismantling of USAID as an independent agency, folding what remained into the State Department, alongside a broader retreat from multilateral commitments abroad — moves that suggested a focus on domestic priorities over international affairs and were a mantra throughout Trump's electoral campaigns to "put America first." In effect, cutting foreign aid was framed as a necessary step to redirect resources towards US citizens — the same logic of taking care of home before abroad, translated into American policy  In practical policy terms, nativist doctrine holds that governments have as their primary duty the promotion and protection of the well-being and welfare of the citizens it deems native, more often than not defined in ethnic terms.

What accounts for the staying power of radical right-wing populist parties?

Much of the current hyped-up debate on radical right-wing populism in advanced liberal democracies, largely inspired by the election of Donald Trump and the outcome of the Brexit referendum, conveys the impression that this is a new phenomenon. Radical right-wing populist parties have been around for decades. A number of them, such as the FPÖ, the Rassemblement national (formerly Front national), and the Lega (formerly Lega Nord), are among the most well-established parties in Western Europe, like France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. In fact, the Lega, which was founded in 1991, is now the “oldest” existing party of the Italian Second Republic, having survived all the ups and downs of almost three decades of Italian politics. Most contemporary radical right-wing populist parties have experienced a series of ups and downs at the polls, and in some cases these fluctuations have been quite dramatic. A case in point is the Vlaams Belang (VB, originally Vlaams Blok). After continuously rising in the polls in the first decade of the new century, the party’s support base had virtually collapsed by the parliamentary election of 2014, with many of its former voters defecting to the relatively moderate Flemish nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. Five years later, the VB was back with a vengeance, increasing the number of its seats in the Belgian Parliament from 3 (2014) to 18.

What then might explain the resilience of contemporary radical right-wing populist parties over an extended period of time? In general, explanations for the rise and success of these parties have primarily focused on macro-structural factors such as “modernisation”, globalisation, economic and financial crises and, more recently, rapid technological innovation. These factors certainly are of prime relevance, particularly for understanding the recent upsurge of radical right-wing support across advanced liberal democracies. The crucial question is, however, how these macro-structural factors translate into support for the radical populist right. Empirical evidence as per Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016)’s "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises”, 1870–2014 shows, for instance, that financial crises tend to result in a significant increase in support for far-right political parties. This was certainly the case in the aftermath of the “Great Recession” of 2008, which, albeit not across the board and to the same extent, saw a significant upsurge in support for the radical populist right in a number of countries.

One of the most compelling explanations for the rise of the populist right is rooted in value-based conflicts or popularly regarded as culture wars. Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism argued that with the rise of affluence in post-war societies, people began to prioritise values like autonomy, tolerance, environmentalism, and self-expression over material concerns. However, not all sections of society embraced these values. Older, rural, and less-educated populations often remained attached to traditional norms - hierarchy, national identity, family values and viewed cultural liberalisation with suspicion. Pippa Norris and Inglehart have conceptualised this backlash as a cultural reaction: the “once-dominant majority” segments feel culturally marginalised by multiculturalism, LGBTQ rights, gender equality, and globalism. This perceived loss of status fuels support for populist leaders who claim to defend national identity and traditional values. In effect, the old economic left–right cleavage is being replaced by a cultural authoritarian–libertarian one. This shift is documented empirically by Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) in their study of 21 Western democracies since 1948: the vote for social democratic and socialist parties, once associated with lower-educated and low-income voters, has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, while high-income voters have continued to back the right. As the authors show, this transition has been accelerated by the rise of green and anti-immigration movements, whose key distinctive feature is to polarize the electorate along sociocultural rather than strictly economic lines. 

Common Threads

Over the past four years, we have seen an unprecedented surge in right-wing populist victories across the globe. From the U.S. and El Salvador to Italy, Hungary, and even India, populist leaders have either returned to power or have emerged with strong mandates. While a few may see this as purely isolated electoral victories caused by political disruptions, there are some strikingly similar patterns: appeals to nationalism, majoritarian identity, direct communication with the general people, and systematic weakening of traditional democratic institutions. Between 2021 and 2025, eleven countries elected leaders who fall under the broad umbrella of right-wing populism. These include Nayib Bukele in El Salvador with 85% of the vote, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in the Philippines with 58.7% vote, Javier Milei in Argentina with 55.65%, and Donald Trump in the U.S. with 49.8%. Even Narendra Modi returned for a third term in India in 2024, albeit with a reduced vote share of 36.56%. All of these numbers indicate a clear electoral trend: right-wing populists are winning, and perhaps, they are winning big.

Under populist rule, political systems are witnessing a systematic weakening of democratic institutions. In Hungary and Turkey, courts, education systems, and the media are increasingly under government pressure. In India, similar concerns have been raised about judicial independence, media freedom, and the use of investigative agencies against political opponents. While elections are held, the level playing field appears to be increasingly uneven. Another trait that works like a charm is direct communication. Leaders like Modi and Trump have used it for great effect and advantage. Trump’s Twitter posts (and now Truth Social) and Modi’s Mann ki Baat have become the medium that shapes public opinion without the interference of journalists or political debates. Due to its personal and unfiltered touch, this style has inadvertently become popular. Now, leaders are able to control the narrative and present themselves as accessible, relatable figures fighting for the common people.

Rise of Populism in Northeast India: A Case of Assam

The political mobilization of parties in India is significantly shaped by the country’s regional diversity, with ethnic and linguistic identities such as Kannada, Tamil, Marathi, and Punjabi serving as critical factors. This mobilization is particularly evident in the Northeast, where various ethnic groups assert their regional interests. Bordering Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and China, the Northeastern states are hubs of ethnic diversity and mobilization. With just 2% of its borders shared with other Indian states, the region comprises eight states connected by the Siliguri Corridor, famously dubbed the “Chicken’s Neck”. The “chicken’s neck” refers to the narrow 21 km corridor connecting Northeast India to mainland India, established by the Radcliffe Line, the boundary drawn by the British colonial administration before their departure in 1947. Each state harbours distinct ethnic groups like Bodos, Nagas, and Mizos, influencing electoral politics with their unique cultures. Regional politics in the Northeast is shaped by social, ethnic, and geographical factors, alongside conflicts over land use and language issues.

Assam, a strategically located state in the Northeast, has emerged as a key hub for the BJP and its populist leader and two-term Chief Minister - Himanta Biswa Sarma. Its strategic geography, connecting all other Northeastern states, plays a crucial role in politics and culture. The rise of populist leaders in Assam can be attributed to various factors, including historical grievances, economic challenges, and the manipulation of ethnic sentiments. These leaders often position themselves as champions of the indigenous Assamese population, pledging to address issues such as illegal immigration, unemployment, and underdevelopment. By tapping into the fears and insecurities of the local population, these leaders have been able to mobilize widespread support and secure electoral victories. The present government acquired landslide victories in Assam in 2014, 2019, and 2024, campaigning on developmental initiatives combined with hyper populism, the success of its long-term strategy bringing the tea plantation workers and tribal communities into the Hindutva fold. In the general elections of 2014, the BJP emerged victorious and appointed Sarbananda Sonowal and Kiran Rijiju as ministers in the central cabinet, which changed the political landscape in the Northeastern region.

The BJP capitalized on impending illegal migration issues, the question of tribal lands, and ethnic conflict to draw the attention of the electorate, and joined hands with the Bodoland People’s Front party of the Bodo tribe as well as Assam Gana Parishad. Prior to the 2014 Lok Sabha election, Narendra Modi highlighted the issue of “illegal immigrants”, asserting that, if elected, they would deport these individuals back to Bangladesh. In Assam, populist leaders frequently make grand promises of economic development and prosperity, tapping into the aspirations of the local population for a better future. Nevertheless, the region’s economic constraints and challenges often impede the realization of these promises.

The rise of populism in Assam exemplifies a complex interaction of ethnic politics, economic constraints, and sociocultural factors. Populist leaders initially build their support base by addressing local grievances and aspirations. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, the BJP secured nine out of fourteen seats in Assam, while the INC won three seats. The BJP’s influence extended beyond Assam, winning two seats each in Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh. The preceding analysis highlights how politicians leverage issues of development, migration and exclusionary politics to secure electoral advantages in the region. Additionally, the alleged granting of citizenship to Bengali Muslims is perceived as a threat by the indigenous Assamese communities, which could potentially trigger renewed unrest in the region. While development issues and social grievances have traditionally driven populist politics in the region, religion has increasingly become a potent force for mobilizing marginalized communities. The current context reveals a clear erosion of secular politics. Social media platforms have emerged as critical instruments for populist leaders, facilitating both inclusive and exclusionary political strategies. It underscores the intolerance towards other religions and communities, necessitating engagement for fostering peaceful co‐existence and nation‐building rather than perpetuating exclusionary ideologies. To mitigate the risks posed by populism and uphold the principles of liberal democracy, citizens play a crucial role in safeguarding their interests and fundamental rights. By comprehensively understanding the drivers and ramifications of populism in Assam, policymakers and researchers can formulate strategies to address underlying issues and foster inclusive and sustainable development in the region.

Conclusion

The post 2008 resurgence of right-wing populism has been a stress test for liberal democracies. Moving forward, preserving the liberal democratic order will require addressing the root grievances that populists exploit, without compromising core values of democracy.The resurgence of the radical right in India shares important structural features with its Western counterparts, even as it diverges sharply in ideological content. As in Western Europe and the United States, the rise of the BJP has been read through the lens of nativism and majoritarian nationalism, with opposition to political pluralism and the protection of minorities representing a distinctive feature of the party's radical interpretation of majoritarian rule. Comparativists have increasingly situated India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alongside its Western European counterparts, though the fit is uneven. On the similarity side, scholars argue that nativism, populism, and authoritarianism are key defining elements in both theory and practice for the BJP, mirroring the ideational core — "the people" against "corrupt elites" and "dangerous others" — that defines parties like the RN, AfD, or FPO. Both waves also rest on a majoritarian ethnocultural imagination: Hindutva propagates a vision of India as an essentially Hindu nation, casting Muslims and Christians as aliens to India's cultural ethos, functionally paralleling Europe's "citizens before non-citizens" logic. The dissimilarities are equally significant, however. Unlike Europe's radical right, which largely emerged as an anti-establishment challenger to postwar consensus parties, the BJP's success draws on two ideological tenets that go beyond the European radical right's core attributes — anti-colonialism and neoliberalism. Structurally too, the comparison is asymmetric: while European radical right parties are typically newcomers contesting for a share of power, the BJP is distinct from Western Europe's relatively new radical populist parties in that it has held sustained, majority national government, meaning its populism operates from the center of the state rather than against it. 

Even in the heartlands of liberal democracy, the struggle to balance popular will with institutional limits persists, and the efforts to make institutions genuinely responsive continue.

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Featured image credits: Populism and Nationalism as Global Trends, illustration: picture alliance / Ikon Images/Eva Bee | Eva Bee