top of page
Search

Skrytnost’ Opredelyayet Sud’bu: Why India’s Strategic Future Lies in Hypersonic Missile Defense

Abstract

“Skrytnost’ Opredelyayet Sud’bu”, when translated from Russian, means “Stealth Determines Destiny”. The introduction of hypersonic missiles in the current security landscape, in addition to their use in the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, has significantly altered power balances between both established Great Powers and emerging powers. The speed at which both conventional and unconventional warheads can be delivered without any sophisticated weapons systems to actually intercept them in flight, not only make them lethal but effective in carrying out attacks, both quickly and in a targeted manner, limiting potential collateral damage. China’s acquisition and development of these hypersonic missiles pose a strategic threat to India, whose relations with Beijing have been strained in the recent past.

 

Introduction

What changed geopolitical military calculations in the 20th Century was the creation of the atomic weapon, whose capabilities triggered an arms race between the two rival hegemons, the United States and the Soviet Union (Fuller, 2023). With time, both countries tried to increase the potency of the atomic weapon through changes in uranium enrichment levels and plutonium production, but as the nuclear attack impact had become symmetrized, the potency of the atomic weapon had become a lesser concern than the speed with which these atomic weapons could be deployed against enemy territory. Initially recognized as the sole means to carry atomic weapons, ballistic missiles evolved in range, from short, medium and intermediate to intercontinental, with Moscow developing ballistic missile systems with the capability to reach any place on Earth (Dangwal, 2022).

 

The need for speed in delivering weapons is significantly important. First, it allows states to carry out targeted strikes against critical installations within a short time frame which prevents enemies from either rebuilding or improving installations or even rolling out any forces. Second, it allows states to add shock value to targeted offensives. The added impact of a quick and effective strike is that it prevents enemy states from reacting- thus instilling fear in people’s minds and alarm within the enemy state. This is purely because of the optics of quick attacks being difficult to intercept but also difficult to pre-empt.

 

Stanley (2006) believes that countries find mobile ballistic missiles attractive because they posit an extreme amount of uncertainty to enemy planners. This was seen in Nazi Germany’s use of V-1 cruise missiles against the United Kingdom, wherein although they were limited in number, they had significant impact- resulting in immense political pressure on Westminster Abbey to counter the V-1 attacks even if it meant abandoning its strategic bombardment campaign against the Nazis. The use of V-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles had an even higher impact as the political crisis that followed, forced Allied Governments to dedicate significant resources to finding and destroying the development centres and launch sites for the V-1 and V-2 missiles in Operation Crossbow (Central Intelligence Agency, 1965).

 

In order to improve on both speed and extent of impact, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an arms race- this started with both countries deploying land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as the US Atlas and the Soviet R-7A (SS-6)  (Wright et al., 2020). The introduction of hypersonic missiles however, has changed the strategic calculus due to the capability of hypersonic missiles to incorporate the high speed capabilities of ICBMs while possessing the ability to manoeuver through anti-air defenses.

 

How are hypersonic missiles an improvement from intercontinental ballistic missiles?

Ballistic missiles in general, tend to follow a fixed and unchanged trajectory. Designers work really hard to make the ballistic trajectory as predictable as possible to achieve target accuracy (Bruno, 2023). This means that there are multiple ways to interdict these missiles, such as launching interceptor missiles after aiming them at a point in front of the incoming warhead along its ballistic trajectory. This usually refers to the use of a Kill Vehicle to collide with the warhead by utilizing its own kinetic energy which is much more potent due to its velocity being higher than the incoming warhead, allowing it to collide with the warhead in a significantly lethal manner. (Bruno, 2023).

 

Technically speaking, hypersonic missiles have existed since the 1950s, having been incorporated as ballistic missiles with ranges beyond 5,500 km. The longer the range of the missile, the greater its velocity and the velocity of the warhead. What makes the cut is the Hypersonic Glide Vehicle, which has the capability to maneuver and amend its flight path, thus rendering the interceptor missile which will have committed to its flight path after having launched, null and void.

 

Bruno (2023) posits that a hypersonic missile can be maneuvered in two different ways: One, by attaching the warhead to be detached in the midcourse of the flight path only after having waited for the defender to launch for an intercept in space, so that the warhead can then maneuver from its current flight path and then attack the target without being intercepted  by a conventional missile which has been dedicated to its flight path. Second, is to use Glide vehicle technology to maneuver inside the atmosphere with aerodynamic control surfaces by using the warhead’s extreme velocity in conjunction with the atmosphere. The aerodynamic lift allows the warhead to avoid transiting through space entirely and subsequently avoiding systems designed to intercept threats in space.

 

This inherently means that hypersonic missiles provide higher advantages than ICBMs, with regards to accuracy and maneuverability, allowing them to avoid potent air defenses and thus, be more capable of carrying out strategic strikes during military operations.

 

What does India’s strategic environment look like?

India’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Having engaged in a state of constant conflict since the first Indo-Pak War of 1948, India’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan continue to remain volatile- with Kashmir being a central issue. The sudden abrogation of Article 370 combined with anti-Pakistan rhetoric from the Indian political apparatus as well as the refusal of Islamabad to address the terror threat, has exacerbated these already existing issues (Adil, 2023).

 

Despite its current economic trouble, Islamabad has been actively expanding Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. Satellite imagery, as well as estimates from the United States Government, indicate that Pakistan might be building larger rocket motors, and have been using US-sanctioned Chinese firms to provide composite materials for ballistic missile motor cases that can make the ballistic missile lighter, allowing for maximisation of payload and range (Wright, 2025). This is in addition to Pakistan’s already existing arsenal of nuclear-capable ground-based ballistic missiles supplemented by air-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles, which could strike key targets within India (Levesques et al., 2021)

 

Recently, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) declared its possession of a hypersonic missile, with the aim to establish a “potent” force and rebalance power dynamics in Asia. Most international observers speculate this to be the Chinese CM-400AKG guided missile which can achieve a speed of Mach 5 (Defense Security Asia, 2024).

 

India’s relations with the People’s Republic of China

The Ladakh crisis had indicated that relations between India and China are far more complex in contemporary times. As Bajpai (2021) posits, countries can fight and become friends, but India and China are still not friends sixty years after the short war in 1962, as the Galwan clash showed. India and China continue to remain peer competitors due to their deep-seated differences over their perceptions of each other, not only as countries but also their perceptions of each other; their territorial perimeters; and their strategic partnerships with the big powers as well as the asymmetry of powers between them (Bajpai, 2021).

 

China has expanded hypersonic missile arsenal significantly, now comprising the Dong Feng 17 (DF-17) which is a medium range missile or system equipped with an HGV and is capable of carrying conventional and nuclear warheads at a reported speed of Mach 5-10, with Mach being a unit of measurement in stating the speed of a moving object in relation to the speed of sound. Recently, China took the United States by surprise with a hypersonic missile test, wherein a long-range missile carried the guided hypersonic warhead around the world and then fired it at a target within China, in addition to firing a different missile that fell in the South China Sea. In addition to this, the People’s Republic of China has reportedly accelerated its production of nuclear warheads which could be carried by a hypersonic missile (The South China Morning Post, 2021).

 

How can India address the hypersonic missile threat?

New Delhi’s response to these proximate threats from both the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China has been mild to say the least. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) recently revealed details of a short-range ballistic missile called BM-04 which is likely to have hypersonic speed. The missile is estimated to be used to neutralize enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities which aim to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area as well as limit the opposing force's freedom of action in the operational area (The Economic Times, 2025). India has additionally successfully tested Scramjet engines, which allow for combustion at supersonic speed without the need for moving parts, forming a key element of hypersonic technology (Arredondas, 2025).

 

While India has successfully tested a long-range hypersonic missile, it is still yet to fulfill the threshold for a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)- a feat achieved by Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The threshold for creating an effective HGV is primarily high due to the lack of  technological advancements required to achieve various design configurations such as the conical, delta winged body, blended body designs, as well as other technicalities associated with suborbital deployment, guidance, targeting, and vehicle design (Shah, 2025).

 

If India currently faces a problem with developing hypersonic missiles in the short term, it would make for a more feasible option for New Delhi to invest in anti-hypersonic missile technologies. India’s recent attempts at purchasing the S-500 Surface-to-Air Missile Systems from Moscow mark a key milestone in this arena, especially considering that the S-500 reportedly possesses the capability to intercept Western hypersonic missiles (Global Defense News, 2025). The United States has itself awarded contracts to Raytheon Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., and Northrop Grumman Corp., to increase market competition for developing an effective and reliable Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI). This is where India should work in tandem with its allies in Washington, which has dedicated significant political and financial resources to bringing about a Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor to fruition, as well as developing radar systems that are able to track and detect hypersonic missiles despite their low-Earth trajectory (Klare, 2022).

 

Hypersonic missiles possess a series of flaws, which can be exploited by other offensive mechanisms, such as those ranging from kinetic effectors and electronic warfare to directed energy systems of various types. Moreover, measures such as terrestrial radar tracking, low-latency networking and battle management modernization, can act as comprehensive counters to contemporary hypersonic technology, as elucidated in detail by Karako & Dahlgren (2022).

 

Conclusion

As the geopolitical stakes keep altering with every new development of military technology, it is vital for India to begin transcending beyond its bureaucratic limitations and utilize its resources as well as soft power capital, to work alongside its partners in Washington and Moscow, to not only build up a credible hypersonic missile defense, but also keep in tandem with Beijing. As Islamabad’s economic considerations have drowned the country’s status politically, financially, and militarily, Beijing needs to take the forefront of Indian foreign policy and security strategy- especially with regards to China’s proliferation of ICBMs, hypersonic missiles, and its nuclear arsenal, all which could play a significant role should China try to lock out New Delhi of any reaction to a potential Chinese transgression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or the McMahon line. Since contemporary geopolitical military optics has been ensued with the emergence of hypersonic missiles, it is critical for New Delhi to shift its focus to countering these missiles, so as to prevent any shock effect and defend against a potential Chinese attack on Indian soil.

 

 References

 

  1. Fuller J. (2023, October 18). How the Nuclear Arms Race Works. howstuffworks.

 

  1. Dangwal, A. (2022, June 23). ‘Nuclear Ashes’: Russia’s Satan Missile is Ready for Deployment; Moscow says can wipe out entire US East Coast. The EurAsian Times.

 

  1. Stanley, R. W. (2006). The Evolution and Spread of Mobile Ballistic Missiles. In Attacking the Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat in the Post–Cold War Environment: New Rules to an Old Game (pp. 5–20). Air University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13896.8

 

  1. CIA (1965, April 30). Operation Crossbow. Central Intelligence Agency.

 

  1. Wright, D., Hartung, W. D., & Gronlund, L. (2020). Origins of the ICBM Force and the Triad. In Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles: Sensible Risk-Reduction Practices for US ICBMs (pp. 6–7). Union of Concerned Scientists. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25225.7

 

  1. Bruno, T. (2023, May 16). Hypersonic Missiles are Just Misunderstood. The Medium

 

  1. Adil, H. (2023, May 8). At SCO summit, India, Pakistan, squabble over Kashmir, ‘terrorism’. Al Jazeera.

 

  1. Wright, T. (2025, February 4). Developments concerning Pakistan’s ballistic-missile programme. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

 

  1. Levesques A., Bowen, D., and Gill, J. H. Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

 

  1. Pakistan Asserts Hypersonic Missile Possession, Experts Point to China-Made CM-400AKG. (2024, February 2). Defense Security Asia.

 

  1. Bajpai, K. (2021). India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends. Juggernaut Books.

 

  1. Chinese hypersonic test included path-breaking second missile launch, say US reports (2021, November 23). The South China Morning Post.

 

 

  1. BM-04 short range ballistic missile: DRDO reveals India’s latest hypersonic weapon (2025, March 6). The Economic Times.

 

  1. Shah, A. (2025, March 9). Technological and Geopolitical Dimensions of India’s Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Ambitions. Modern Diplomacy.

 

  1. Arredondas, M. (2025, February 6). India is making decisive progress in the race for hypersonic weapons. Atalayar.

 

  1. Focus: Russia claims that new S-500 air defense system can intercept Western hypersonic missiles. (2025, February 26). Global Defense News.

 

  1. Klare, M.T. (2022, January/February). Pentagon Awards Anti-Hypersonic Missile Contracts. Arms Control Association.

 

  1. Karako, T. & Dahlgren, M. (2022, February). Complex Air Defense: Countering the Hypersonic Threat. Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

 

Comments

bottom of page